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UNCITRAL Model Law: Reforming Electronic Procurement,
Reverse Auctions, and Framework Contracts
BY DON WALLACE, JR., CHRISTOPHER R. YUKINS, AND JASON P. MATECHAK

Don Wallace

Christopher R. Yukins

A working group of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) recently met in
Vienna, Austria, for a week of debate on potential reforms
to UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Procurement of Goods,
Construction and Services and its Guide to Enactment.
The working group reached initial consensus on a number
of difficult procurement issues, including electronic commerce, reverse auctions, and “framework” contracts, and
significant progress was made in a number of other areas including the procurement of services, the strengthening of
procurement remedies (known in the United States as “bid
protests”), and the utilization of socioeconomic policy tools.
Early in 2005, the group will reconvene to move further toward a reformed Model Law that can be used as a benchmark for sound procurement practices around the world.
The UNCITRAL Model Law1 was originally adopted by
the UNCITRAL member states in 1994; it followed on an
earlier model, which did not cover procurement of services.
The Model Law is designed to assist nations in reforming
and modernizing their laws on procurement procedures; it is
built on ensuring competition, transparency, fairness and
objectivity in procurement so that nations will be able to
buy goods and services more cheaply and efficiently.
In the summer of 2003, the UNCITRAL member states
met in New York and endorsed an initiative to reform the
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Model Law, in part to allow
the Model Law to accommodate new types of electronic
procurement.2 Per that direction, in early 2004 a group of
experts met in Vienna to discuss potential reforms to the
Model Law.3 In a meeting in
New York in July 2004,
UNCITRAL’s member states
approved further reform efJason P. Matechak
forts by a working group from
the member states, and so from
August 30 through September 3, 2004,4 the UNCITRAL
working group met in Vienna.
Several of the issues before the working group have, in recent years, forced deeply divisive debates among the procurement communities in the United States, Europe, and
countries with developing and transitional economies. From
electronic procurement, to reverse auctions, to “framework”
contracts, to socioeconomic programs, the issues addressed
in Vienna were, in fact, issues that have drawn keen debate
in the United States and the European Union.5 Although
the Model Law is not binding on any country, including the
United States, it offers a useful backdrop to procurement reform in countries around the world. The UNCITRAL
working group was able to find middle ground on at least
some of the divisive issues in procurement policy, and so the
working group’s progress—and the overall reform of the
Model Law—offer hopeful signs for procurement reform
worldwide.
In tackling each of these issues, the UNCITRAL working group built on the basic principles that underlie the
Model Law: competition, transparency, efficiency, nondiscrimination (equal treatment of bidders), and integrity.
Consistent with those central principles and mindful of developments from around the world, the working group’s
goal is to make it easier for other nations—especially developing and transition-economy nations—to adopt the
Model Law as the foundation of a properly functioning
procurement system. With these principles in mind, the
working group came to a general consensus in the areas of
electronic procurement, electronic reverse auctions, and
suppliers lists, and made significant progress in the areas of
the procurement of services, the strengthening of procurement remedies, and the utilization of socioeconomic policy
tools. Each of these areas will be discussed in turn.
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Electronic Procurement
When UNCITRAL launched this reform effort, the commission’s chief goal was to bring the Model Law into the
world of electronic commerce.6 The UNCITRAL member
states hope that the Model Law and its Guide to Enactment, like the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in
the United States and the European procurement directives,7 will eventually reflect at least some of the enormous
changes that electronic communications have brought to
procurement.
Based to some extent on the experiences of more developed nations, including the United States and Canada, the
working group emphasized that any effort in the area of
electronic procurement must be “technology-neutral.”
That is, to accommodate rapidly changing technologies,
procurement systems must not tie themselves to any specific technology or solution.8
Beyond technology-neutrality, the working group came
to an easy consensus that the electronic publication of procurement information including laws, regulations, procurement opportunities, and contract awards should be promoted but not mandated.
Likewise, the working group members generally urged
that the Model Law allow procurement systems to adopt
electronic means gradually and incrementally. While the
U.S. experience over the last decade showed that electronic means could bring huge savings in procurement, the
General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) held early on that U.S. contractors
could reasonably be required to use computers to access opportunities,9 and the U.S. central site for listing business
opportunities has been a great success,10 in general U.S.
procurement officials have been reluctant to force electronic solutions onto the procurement system. Consistent
with that experience, the working group was somewhat
more cautious about the use of electronic communications.
Taking into consideration the notion of technological
neutrality discussed above, as well as the divergent infrastructural realities in UNCITRAL member countries, the
working group promoted the concept that electronic communications could be promoted through revisions to the
Model Law and to the Guide to Enactment, but should not
be strictly required.

Electronic Reverse Auctions11
There was, however, less consensus among the UNCITRAL
working group members on the use of electronic reverse
auctions, which continue to be a point of debate. In a reverse auction, prospective sellers “bid” against one another
to offer the buyer (in this case, a government) the lowest
price. In electronic form, this ancient model is brought
into the 21st century: prospective contractors typically bid
against one another in an electronic forum, generally
anonymously and rapidly against a fixed deadline.

The working group began with the premise that the
Model Law is currently silent on the issue of reverse auctions and that the use of electronic reverse auctions is still
a newer and relatively untested concept in procurement
regimes in all of the UNCITRAL member states represented. For example, in the United States, while electronic reverse auctions have been utilized, the regulatory structure
surrounding reverse auctions remains largely unfinished.12
As the UNCITRAL secretariat noted, other countries,
such as France and Brazil, have used electronic reverse auctions with some success, the United Kingdom has endorsed
the use of reverse auctions, and draft proposed revisions to
the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA) contemplate the use of reverse auctions.13 Probably the most important international endorsement of reverse auctions in procurement, however,
has come from the European Union (EU), which in March
2004 issued directives14 specifically allowing—indeed requiring—member states to permit reverse auctions in public procurement.15 While the prefatory16 and substantive17
terms of the EU directives do provide a good deal of guidance on when reverse auctions are appropriate, they leave
unanswered many serious questions as to when reverse auctions could, in fact, be inappropriate or dangerous.
Although the working group did discuss options when
reverse auctions work best, such as in the procurement of
commodities or standardized items, where competitions
turn on price, not necessarily quality, the working group
was notably concerned that electronic reverse auctions
could be subject to overuse, misuse, and abuse. The working group was particularly concerned with the problem of
below-cost pricing.
In light of the still-evolving discussion on electronic reverse auctions, the working group participants left open
how, ultimately, the UNCITRAL Model Law and/or its
Guide to Enactment should deal with this issue. The
UNCITRAL’s secretariat (its professional staff) was asked
to prepare several studies on the implementation of reverse
auctions around the world.

Suppliers’ Lists and Framework Agreements
Major points of discussion in the working group included
how to address supplier lists—a list of preapproved suppliers—and “framework agreements,” which the European
Union’s recent directives specifically endorsed. Framework
agreements are master agreements, typically awarded to
several contractors simultaneously. After the initial master
agreements are in place, the awardees then compete
against one another for task or delivery orders (or contracts), which are competed among the master contract
holders only. In the United States, these are colloquially
referred to as “task- and delivery-order” contracts, or as “indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity” (IDIQ) contracts. In
the United States, their use has exploded since they were
first recognized in the 1990s’ wave of regulatory reform.

2 • The Procurement Lawyer • American Bar Association • Winter 2005 • Number 40 • Volume 2
“UNCITRAL Model Law: Reforming Electronic Procurement, Reverse Auctions, and Framework Contracts”, by Don Wallace, Jr., Christopher R. Yukins, and
Jason P. Matechak, published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 40, Number 2, Winter 2005. © 2005 American Bar Association. Reproduced by permission.
All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

As the Model Law does not directly address the topic of
suppliers’ lists, many members of the working group approached this issue with caution, due to the risk that government buyers and contractors could use the supplier lists
to discriminate against potential new entrants to the market in contravention to the Model Law’s mandate for competition. Traditional international experience with supplier lists has been less than favorable, especially where those
lists were mandatory, and were highly discriminatory
against market entrants. However, as discussed below, the
efficiency and transparency brought to procurement by
technological tools drew the working group to reconsider
the utilization of suppliers’ lists. Nonetheless, the working
group consensus was that further consideration of procedural protections will need to be undertaken prior to the
working group’s formulation of specific provisions on suppliers’ lists.
Building out of the discussion of suppliers’ lists, the
working group addressed as a parallel issue how to deal
with framework agreements, which are becoming increasingly popular in both the U.S. and the European public
procurement markets. The problems with framework
agreements are in some ways similar to those with supplier lists. Indeed, the most popular framework agreements
in the U.S. market—the schedule contracts let by the
General Services Administration (GSA)—can in many
ways be compared to optional supplier lists, for now thousands of contractors have been qualified under these nonmandatory contract vehicles. The working group noted
the differences between the U.S. and European approaches to framework contracts, including the way in
which they deal with requirements that are let after the
initial framework agreements. In the U.S. system, once
the framework contracts are in place, subsequent requirements are competed as orders under the existing contracts—the subsequent competitions are not for “contracts,” and so the normal transparency and competition
requirements do not apply.18
Under the European directives, in contrast, after framework agreements are in place, subsequent requirements are
competed and awarded as contracts, and so may trigger (at
least some of) the normal transparency and competition
requirements.19 While the U.S. approach may move in this
direction over time, at this point the U.S. framework contracts are, ultimately, far less competitive and transparent
than those contemplated by the European directives. The
open question for the UNCITRAL working group, therefore, will be whether the Model Law and the Guide to Enactment will allow framework contracts in developing nations, and other nations undertaking procurement reform
initiatives, to follow a more open, competitive process, or
will framework arrangements be allowed to evolve into islands of dramatically lower competition and transparency.
The working group has also left open the question of
whether the Model Law or the Guide to Enactment should

be modified at all in this regard; alternatively, the issue of
framework contracts could be left to local regulation.

Other Areas of Progress: Socioeconomic
Programs, Services, and Remedies
The UNCITRAL working group is also addressing how
the Model Law might handle socioeconomic initiatives
that are intertwined with procurement systems.20 While
many procurement systems around the world include socioeconomic requirements, traditionally the European
Union has approached socioeconomic requirements cautiously because such requirements can have a profoundly
discriminatory impact on procurement from other nations.
Since nondiscrimination and the opening of the European
market are core goals for the European Union, socioeconomic requirements are only cautiously allowed. In the
United States, in contrast, Congress has overlaid the procurement system with a wide variety of socioeconomic requirements, ranging from race-based preferences to stringent goals for procurements let to service-disabled
veterans. In the United States, policy makers generally
have not seen public procurement as part of a broader free
market, and so have made few efforts to dismantle the socioeconomic programs that, though discriminatory, answer
the demands made by a wide variety of interest groups.
The UNCITRAL working group recognized that socioeconomic programs would affect the economy and efficiency of an overall procurement system. However, the
working group also recognized that the power of public
spending is an important social policy tool. A number of
working group members commented on the positive contributions of socioeconomic programs in a wide array of geographic, political, and cultural scenarios. With these considerations in mind, the working group will continue to
evaluate the effectiveness of such programs and whether
additional procedural protections will need to be introduced into the Model Law and Guide to Enactment when
socioeconomic programs are utilized in procurement.
Thus, the UNCITRAL working group will have to weigh
the very different role that socioeconomic preferences—
say, for a particularly disadvantaged group—may play in
smaller, emerging economies.
In the area of services, the working group began with the
recognition that the Model Law methodology for procuring
services differs from that used for the procurement of goods
and public works. The working group also recognized that
the 1993 version of the Model Law (upon which the current Model Law was built) covered only goods and construction, and that a more intensive consideration of service procurement is possibly required. The working group
sought to draw upon the experiences of the member states
in the use of procurement methodologies that considered
non-price factors and allowed for discussions, clarifications,
and negotiations in the procurement of services. The working group also considered how these various national expe-
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riences could be distilled to provide a single approach in the
Model Law and Guide to Enactment.
The final area of progress in the working group involved
remedies and enforcement of procurement laws and regulations. The working group recognized many national remedies regimes such as those of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France, with their respective specialization,
generalization and administrative approaches to procurement dispute resolution. The working group also noted that
it would look to the Government Procurement Agreement
(GPA), the European Union (EU), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and other supranational regimes, for possible solutions for rectifying supplier
complaints. Recognizing the inhering differences in each of
these regimes, the working group is considering more forcefully setting forth recommendations and conclusions as to
remedies in the Model Law and Guide to Enactment.

Conclusion
As the UNCITRAL reform process unfolds over the coming months and years, procurement practitioners around
the world would be well served to monitor the emerging
international consensus on a model procurement law. Although the Model Law is not, strictly speaking, applicable
to the procurement regime of any particular country,
changes to the Model Law will help to highlight possible
areas for reform in national procurement systems and allow
for greater participation in the procurement systems of
PL
other countries.
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